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Abstract
Background: Brazil became the first developing country to guarantee free and universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, with
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) being delivered to nearly 190,000 patients. The analysis of ARV price evolution and market
dynamics in Brazil can help anticipate issues soon to afflict other developing countries, as the 2010 revision of the World
Health Organization guidelines shifts demand towards more expensive treatments, and, at the same time, current evolution
of international legislation and trade agreements on intellectual property rights may reduce availability of generic drugs for
HIV care.
Methods and Findings: Our analyses are based on effective prices paid for ARV procurement in Brazil between 1996 and
2009. Data panel structure was exploited to gather ex-ante and ex-post information and address various sources of
statistical bias. In-difference estimation offered in-depth information on ARV market characteristics which significantly
influence prices. Although overall ARV prices follow a declining trend, changing characteristics in the generic segment help
explain recent increase in generic ARV prices. Our results show that generic suppliers are more likely to respond to factors
influencing demand size and market competition, while originator suppliers tend to set prices strategically to offset
compulsory licensing threats and generic competition.
Significance: In order to guarantee the long term sustainability of access to antiretroviral treatment, our findings highlight
the importance of preserving and stimulating generic market dynamics to sustain developing countries’ bargaining power
in price negotiations undertaken with originator companies.
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Introduction
Brazil became the first developing country to guarantee free and
universal access to Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy
(HAART). Access to HIV/AIDS treatment was established as a
legal right in 1996, but public delivery of antiretroviral drugs
(ARVs) started as early as 1991. In 2009, HAART was delivered
to nearly 190,000 people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA),
covering more than 90% of estimated need according to previous
2006 World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines [1]. Access to
HIV/AIDS treatment in Brazil has been sustained through a set of
strategies mixing local generic production of off-patent ARVs,
centralized procurement, and the threat of issuing compulsory
licenses on patent-protected drugs [2]. Historically, Brazil’s
defiance to originator company monopolies produced positive
spillovers to antiretroviral treatment (ART) scaling-up programs in
other developing countries. Brazilian imports of active pharma-
ceutical ingredients (APIs) from countries such as India and China
facilitated the creation of an international market for generic
ARVs [3]. From 1998 to 2004, there was a 2.5-fold increase in the
number of treated patients while mean annual ARV spending per
patient in Brazil, including all patient groups (prophylactic,
pediatric, and adult) and regimens, decreased more than 73%.
This trend, however, has been interrupted since 2005, due to both
the incorporation of new ARVs to tackle therapeutic toxicity and
drug resistance and the need of a growing number of patients to
move on to more expensive second and third-line regimens. In
2009, according to information provided by the Brazilian Ministry
of Health, total ARV spending approached $316 million, with
nearly 72.5% of this budget spent on drugs delivered exclusively
by originator patent-holding companies.
The Brazilian experience in ART provision and its drawbacks
can help anticipate many of the issues soon to afflict other
developing countries, as the 2010 revision of the WHO guidelines
shifts demand towards more expensive therapies [4,5]; at the same
time, current evolution of international legislation and trade
agreements on intellectual property rights (IPRs) may reduce
availability of generic drugs for HIV care [6–8]. As Table 1 shows,
the Brazilian Health System provides the decentralized delivery of
20 ARVs and one fixed dose combination (FDC), totaling 33 child
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been enforced in the country since May 1997. Considering the
latest available information on patent approvals and pending
patent applications in Brazil, from the Brazilian Institute of
Intellectual Property patent database, nine of the ARV drugs
included in Table 1 are under IPR protection. The patent on
Abacavir expired in June 2008. That same year, the patent on
Tenofovir was denied. Regarding the use of compulsory licenses,
although several threats to grant them were made in the past,
notably involving drugs such as Nelfinavir, Efavirenz and
Lopinavir boosted by Ritonavir, only one compulsory license
was actually declared on Efavirenz in May 2007 [2].
ARV procurement in Brazil is centralized by the Ministry of
Health, which is also in charge of issuing HAART guidelines.
These guidelines are discussed and established by an independent
group of experts, where priority is given to treatment quality over
costs [9]. Periodical revising of treatment recommendations takes
place in order to incorporate the latest available medical evidence.
The inclusion of new ARVs in these guidelines has sometimes
been accelerated by repeated lawsuits filed by individuals and civil
society groups [10–12]. Another important feature of the HIV
care policy in Brazil regards treatment individualization. In order
to maximize adherence to treatment and postpone resistance, a
vast array of ARVs is available in first-line prescription
formularies, allowing physicians to best adapt therapy to patient’s
individual characteristics and needs. Although the Brazilian
government holds strong bargaining power as the sole purchaser
of ARVs in the country, this power may be limited by the large
freedom physicians have to prescribe the ARV regimen they judge
most appropriate for their patients. These prescriptions must,
however, conform to treatment guidelines, which impose strict
restrictions concerning the use of drugs reserved for ‘‘salvage
therapy’’ (as for Enfuvirtide, Darunavir, Raltegravir, and, most
recently, Etravirine), for the treatment of pregnant women and in
cases of co-morbidities, such as hepatitis and tuberculosis, to avoid
drug interactions. [12] The existence of such restrictions, added to
the fact that HAART must combine at least three drugs from two
different classes, reduces the possibilities of substituting one ARV
for another and favors market concentration [13].
Looking into the ARV market supply side, originator companies
and generic suppliers form two quasi-parallel market segments.
Among ARV manufactures registered at the Brazilian National
Health Surveillance Agency in 2009, eight were public laborato-
ries, five locally-owned private companies, eight originator
companies and two foreign generic suppliers. Patented drugs are
strictly supplied by foreign patent or license-holding companies.
An exception applies to Efavirenz which, after compulsory
licensing in 2007, has ultimately been supplied by a public
laboratory. Non-patented ARVs are supplied by local and foreign
companies. Local generic production, involving both public
laboratories and private companies, provided eight ARVs and
one FDC in 2009 (see Table 1). Additionally, local supply of
generic Ritonavir took place from 2002 to 2006. As for generic
Tenofovir, local supply is to begin in 2011 [14]. Finally, imports
from foreign generic or originator companies for the supply of
non-patented ARVs occurs when local production proves
insufficient to satisfy demand.
ARV production in Brazil initiated in 1993, at a private
laboratory, and was followed by the public sector in 1994.
Pressured by the soaring costs of ART provision, in 1998 the
government reactivated pharmaceutical production capacity in
public laboratories that had been lying dormant since the previous
decade [15]. Generic ARV supply has then been progressively
shifted to public facilities. Since 2002, local private production of
generic ARVs has specialized in the supply of drugs or
formulations not provided by the public sector [13]. This led to
an important decrease in the total number of generic suppliers
present in the Brazilian ARV market, from 19 in 2002, down to 5
in 2009. Furthermore, considering that public laboratories’
capacity is restricted to drug formulation, local ARV production
is heavily dependent on API imports from China and India
[13,16]. Public API procurement policy, based on lowest price
rather than quality criteria, coupled by negative tax and regulatory
discrimination towards local companies, has contributed to the
dismantling of private API producers in the Brazilian territory who
have been unable to compete in equal terms with foreign suppliers
[17].
Over the past decades pharmaceutical price regulation in Brazil
underwent considerable changes. During the 1990s, pharmaceu-
tical drugs were not subject to price control in the Brazilian market
[18]. A formal regulation system was introduced in 2000 when the
Drug Chamber was created as part of the Brazilian National
Health Surveillance Agency. From that year until 2003, when the
Drug Chamber was replaced by the Chamber of Drug Market
Regulation, price control was based on retrospective manufactur-
ing costs [19]. Since 2003, drug prices are adjusted on an annual
basis according to a price cap derived from past inflation, expected
sector productivity, observed pharmaceutical input cost variation
and level of intraclass market concentration [20]. The price of new
drugs take into account prices practiced in the international
market, while generic drugs have had their prices set at, in the
least, 35% lower than the price of the originator drug [19]. In the
case of ARVs, however, since the Ministry of Health has a
regulatory monopoly for their procurement, the usual pharma-
ceutical price regulation mechanism does not directly apply and
ARV prices are the outcome of negotiations between the Ministry
and the various suppliers.
This paper aims at empirically analyzing factors that have
influenced ARV price evolution in Brazil and achieving an
understanding of their effects on market dynamics. Previous
studies of the Brazilian ARV market [21–23] have adopted
descriptive approaches, while recent attempts to model ARV price
determinants at the global level [24,25,27] have faced complex
methodological problems due to lack of data standardization and
limited comparability. The Global Price Reporting Mechanism,
set by the WHO, and the Global Fund Price and Quality
Reporting Tool databases employed by these analyses mainly
contain donor-funded procurement transactions. In this sense,
they may not be representative of ARV prices paid in the
developing world. Additionally, their prices are not standardized
according to tax, shipping and insurance supplements. Our study
relies on exhaustive and standardized data covering ARV
procurement in Brazil from 1996 to 2009. Considering that these
data, which are provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Health, are
used for budgeting and accountability procedures, their reliability
is very high. Taking into account a set of candidate drug price
determinants, we have employed an econometric approach
adapted to the characteristics of the Brazilian ARV market
structure. We further address important methodological issues
concerning demand endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity
bias that, to our knowledge, have not been dealt with by previous
analyses.
Materials and Methods
Dataset Configuration
Our analyses are based on effective prices paid for ARV
procurement in Brazil between 1996 and 2009. The study dataset
Antiretroviral Drug Price Determinants
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market characteristics from different sources. Data on ARV
transactions, including drug strength and dosage form, supplier,
date, quantity and price, as well as number of treated patients have
been provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Health. Data on
registered ARV suppliers have been collected from the Brazilian
National Health Surveillance Agency electronic database. United
States (US) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) market approval
dates have been included, as proxies of first launch in any market,
in order to calculate drug age. Brazilian HIV/AIDS treatment
guidelines, issued between 1996 and 2008, have been used to
gather information on drugs allowed in first-line therapy and
possible intraclass drug substitutions. Annual Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) was obtained from the Central Bank of Brazil
website. Finally, patent information has been checked using the
Brazilian Institute of Industrial Property patent database.
For the purposes of our analysis, we have selected transactions
on drugs used for adult treatment for which standard yearly
dosage could be calculated. We excluded observations referring to
FDCs for consistency of comparability. Our initial sample
included 378 observations referring to transactions on 21 ARVs
(Appendix S1). All transaction prices include insurance and freight
up to delivery point; imported ARVs are delivered directly to the
Brazilian Ministry of Health; locally produced ARVs may be
delivered to this same organism or to state governments. No
import tax applies to ARVs. All prices have been converted to US
dollars, applying geometric mean exchange rates per transaction
year, calculated by using daily rates provided by the Central Bank
of Brazil. These prices have been adjusted for inflation to 2009
dollars using the annual US Consumer Price Index for medical
care items, available from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Finally, the procured quantities and transaction prices have been
standardized in terms of yearly dose, as defined by current
Brazilian HIV/AIDS treatment guidelines:
Purchased quantities of yearlydose:
QYD~ numberofunitsbought ðÞ =
½ number ofunits used in a daily dose ðÞ | 365 days ðÞ  
Price per yearly dose: PYD~(unit price in 2009}USD)|
number of unitsused inadailydose ðÞ | 365 days ðÞ
In the case of protease inhibitors which are boosted by the drug
Ritonavir, their combined annual cost has been considered for
calculating PYD.
We next exploited our dataset panel structure to gather ex-ante
and ex-post information. Transaction pairs were constructed from
observations for ARVs purchased from the same supplier in two
consecutive years. This manipulated dataset resulted in 246
observations, which exhibited a structure similar to that of the
original dataset (Appendix S2). This allowed keeping row-
information on t and t+1 transactions. For example, if AZT has
been supplied by the same supplier S1 from 1996 to 2000, in our
subset, AZTS1 will be associated to four rows. Holding supplier
constant enabled us to identify changes in transaction character-
istics and their consequences on price evolution.
Analytic Approach
We carried out two analyses over the dataset, one concerning
the entire market and another stratified according to originator
(n=78) and generic ARV suppliers (n=168). We first estimated
PYD determinants from the following multivariate regression
equation, using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS):
ln(PYD)itz1~azb1 ln(QYD)itz1zb2Xitz1zeitz1;
i~eachtransaction
ð1Þ
Our dependent variable, PYD, was transformed in natural
logarithm. Explanatory variables were: the natural logarithm of
demand quantity (QYD); ARV therapeutic class - NRTI, NNRTI, PI
and FI; drug age - whether five years and more after FDA approval
(=1) or not (=0); weight specific formulation - whether exclusive for
adult patients weighting less than 60 kg (=1) or not (=0); therapeutic
recommendations - whether included in first-line HAART recom-
mendations (=1) or not (=0); number of intraclass substitutes; number
of potential suppliers in the market - number of registered suppliers in
the respective transaction year; and, type of supplier - whether
originator (=1) or generic (=0). Time evolution was controlled by the
introduction of two different aggregate conditions in the model: the
natural logarithm of GDP, in current 2009 US dollars; and, number of
Table 1. ARV Drugs Delivered in Brazil.
Therapeutic Class Generic Name
Inclusion
Year
Nucleoside Reverse
Transcriptase Inhibitor (NRTI)
Zidovudine (AZT)* 1991
Didanosine (ddI)*
¤ 1993
Zalcitabine (ddC)
6 1996
Lamivudine (3TC)* 1996
Estavudine (d4T)* 1997
AZT+3TC [FDC]* 1998
Abacavir (ABC) 2001
Tenofovir (TDF) 2003
Didanosine EC (ddI EC) 2005
Non-Nucleoside Reverse
Transcriptase Inhibitor (NNRTI)
Nevirapine (NVP)* 1998
Delavirdine (DLV)
6 1999
Efavirenz (EFV)*
+ 1999
Etravirine (ETR) 2010
Protease Inhibitor (PI) Saquinavir (SQV)* 1996
Ritonavir (RTV) 1996
Indinavir (IDV)* 1997
Nelfinavir (NFV)
+ 6 1998
Amprenavir (APV)
+¤ 2001
Lopinavir/RTV (LPV/r)
+ 2002
Atazanavir (ATV)
+ 2004
Fosamprenavir (FPV)
+ 2005
Darunavir (DRV)
+ 2008
Fusion Inhibitor (FI) Enfuvirtide (T-20)
+ 2005
Integrase Inhibitor (II) Raltegravir (RAL)
+ 2009
*Locally produced ARV (2009);
+IPR protected;
¤Child formulation only;
6No longer available.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023478.t001
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1:10,000 respectively. For the purpose of correcting collinearity
between them, ln(GDP) was further detrended (before detrending:
r=0.942, p,0.001; after detrending: r=0.075, p=0.202).
In order to establish estimation consistency, we tested demand
exogeneity, i.e., whether demand quantity is effectively independent of
price. Conventional economic theory suggests that demand quantity
(purchase volume) and price reciprocally influence each other and
should be mutually explained. Including demand as a determinant of
price in an econometric estimation, therefore, raises an important
methodological issue called endogeneity. As it might be impossible to
observe all relevant attributes of the ARV market in Brazil, and in
other countries as well, ARV demand may itself reflect some of these
attributes: unobserved variables such as the context of price negotiation
or other characteristics pertaining to the procurement process may
affect both the volumes of drugs actually purchased and the level of
prices, and consequently demand quantity cannot be considered as an
independent determinant of price. However, in the Brazilian context,
where there is legal obligation to provide universal access to HAART
free of charge,it is possible to make the hypothesis that ARVdemand is
defined on the basis of medical needs and independently of price. To
check this exogeneity hypothesis, we implemented the augmented
regression test suggested by Davidson and McKinnon (1993) [23].
Previous analyses on ARV price determinants have introduced drug
purchase volume as an independent explanatory variable but, to our
knowledge, they have failed to test this important assumption [24–26].
This may be due to difficulties in finding appropriate instruments. In
our case, this has been made possible by exploiting row-data
information. Our pooled OLS model has been estimated at t+1 to
allow employing lagged QYD as an instrument.
OLSregressionisthemost commontechnique used foranalyzing
the relationship between one or more explanatory variables and the
dependent variable. The implementation of pooled OLS estima-
tions is – undoubtedly - the best way of identifying the determinants
of an outcome, such as ARV prices. Nevertheless, pooled OLS
estimation makes the assumption that available information suffices
to explain price variability. This may pose additional methodolog-
ical problems when the dependent variable is susceptible to being
affected by unobserved factors. This strong assumption can be
relaxed by controlling unobserved heterogeneity. In-difference
estimation using ex-ante and ex-post information allows controlling
for both time-constant observed and unobserved heterogeneity. It
also has the advantage of correcting variable endogeneity, since
unobserved heterogeneity constitutes the main source of this
problem [28,29]. However, the implementation of this technique
requires large datasets in order to construct observation-pairs that
reflect changes between two points in time. Another fallback is that
this technique does not provide information on the specific effect of
time-constant factors although these are controlled for. For this
reason, the in-difference regression is often implemented as a
complement to pooled OLS estimation. In the in-difference model
we use, supplier is kept constant and row-price differentials are
explained by time-varying factors available in the dataset: changes
in demand quantity; therapeutic recommendations; number of
intra-class substitutes; number of potential suppliers; as well as GDP
and number of treated patients.
ln(PYD)itz1{ln(PYD)it

~
b1 ln(QYD)itz1{ln(QYD)it

z
b2 Xitz1{Xit ½  z eitz1{eit ½ 
ð2Þ
Results
Time-varying Characteristics
The manipulated dataset allowed for the observation of
Brazilian ARV market time-varying characteristics. Table 2
illustrates mean price and quantity row-differentials over the
study period. Overall, between two consecutive years, mean PYD
decreased 15% and mean QYD increased 3%. Mean interannual
PYD decrease has been evenly distributed between originator and
generic segments (15%). Nonetheless, mean originator drug
demand increased at an average rate of 21% while the demand
for generic drugs decreased at nearly 5%, from one year to the
next.
Table 3 shows relative frequency of ARV transaction
characteristics. Nearly 85% of originator drug transactions
involved a price decrease, compared to 55% of generics. QYD,
on the other hand, showed near even distribution between
segments. Although mean changes in guideline therapy recom-
mendations from one year to another took effect only in a minority
of cases (i.e., involving less than 17% of originator drugs and
nearly 7% of generic drugs in our sample), they mostly favored
including originator drugs (12% against 5% for generic drugs). As
for market competition, considering the number of intraclass
substitutes, product alternatives increased in about 27% of the
cases. In terms of potential suppliers, which concerns mainly off-
patent drugs, for every two consecutive years, more than half of
generic transactions involved fewer number of competitors than
the previous year.
Models Estimation
Pooled OLS estimation results are presented in Table 4, after
correcting for QYD endogeneity present in the general market
and the generic segment by applying the instrumental variable in
two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification (Appendix S3). The
‘‘all’’ column shows estimates for the general market. The
association between demand volume and price is statistically
significant (p=0.001) and can be here interpreted as partial
elasticity. Ceteris paribus, a 1% demand increase results in close to
0.24% mean price decrease. The effect of type of supplier stands
out, as originator drugs cost, on average, 132% more than generic
drugs (p,0.001). Considering that the Brazilian ARV market
structure is better characterized by two parallel segments
(originator and generic drug supply), we next compare stratified
estimations.
Regarding drug characteristics, both therapeutic class and drug
age hold significant price effects. In the case of originator drugs,
whereas we observed no statistical difference between NNRTI and
NRTI classes, everything else held equal, mean prices are 38%
Table 2. Interannual PYD and QYD Differentials in the
Brazilian ARV Market (1996–2009).
All
Originator
Drugs Generic Drugs
Row-Differentials (n=246) (n=78) (n=168)
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Ln(PYD) 20.150 0.328 20.148 0.205 20.150 0.372
Ln(QYD) 0.032 1.151 0.206 1.455 20.049 0.974
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023478.t002
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generics, NRTI mean prices increase 34% compared to NNRTI
(p=0.008) and 167% to PI (p,0.001). In terms of age, as
expected, mean prices decrease as drugs pass the five-year
threshold, the difference being nearly 27% for originator
(p=0.018) and 43% for generic drugs (p=0.009). Moreover,
drugs used exclusively by adult patients weighing less than 60 kg
cost less in both originator and generic drugs (21.093 and 20.928;
p,0.001). Therapeutic guidelines, however, proved no significant
association to price in either market segment.
As for market characteristics, only the generic segment seems
responsive. Ceteris paribus, when demand increases 1% prices fall
on average 0.29% (p=0.001). Number of intraclass substitutes,
however, shows no significant effect and number of potential
suppliers, although significant, holds the opposite sign. In this
generic segment, prices increasen e a r l yt w i c et h ep r o p o r t i o no f
GDP increase (2.051%; p,0.001) and decrease 12% for every
additional 10,000 patients treated. Originator drug prices vary
only in response to number of treated patients (29%;
p,0.001).
Whereas segmented market analysis seems more adequate in
modeling ARV price determinants in Brazil, unobserved hetero-
geneity could be interfering with some of our results. In-difference
estimation, presented in Table 5, allows for in-depth analysis of the
impact of dynamic aspects on price variation. On the side of
originator drugs, time-varying characteristics provided no addi-
tional information. Statistical significance and mathematical signs
remained the same as in Table 4. As for generic drugs, partial
price elasticity to demand and GDP, as well as effect of number of
treated patients on prices were confirmed. Additional information
refers to the effect of therapeutic guideline changes and number of
potential suppliers, where holding supplier constant reveals
different findings from the previous estimation. In-difference
estimation shows that the inclusion of a drug in recommendations
for first-line therapy holds a downward effect on prices. Moreover,
number of suppliers now shows the correct sign, indicating that the
arrival (departure) of a supplier in the market forces prices down
(up). The correct coefficient sign obtained through the in-
difference estimation clearly reflects that the number of potential
suppliers is a significant determinant of prices only when price
changes are observed within the same firm. Indeed, the ‘‘wrong’’
sign associated to the variable number of potential suppliers in the
pooled OLS estimation was probably due to the fact that such a
model does not control for unobserved factors and was not able to
take into account price variations within the same firm.
Discussion
Over the study period (1996–2009), mean ARV prices
decreased in Brazil at a similar pace for both originator and
generic drugs. In other words, both discounts from originator
companies and generic competition have contributed to making
ART more affordable in Brazil. Striking, however, is the fact that
more than half of generic transactions in our dataset, considering
the same ARV and supplier, correspond to price increase, whereas
nearly 85% of originator transactions involve price decrease.
These findings look rather paradoxical, but they corroborate those
presented by Nunn and colleagues (2007) [23]. Using Brazilian
ARV procurement data from 2001 to 2005, the authors concluded
that while Brazil was able to obtain considerable discounts from
originator companies, locally produced ARV prices remained
higher than those of the global generic market and presented an
increasing trend. One possible explanation is that originator drugs
hold a higher margin from which to decrease prices, while generic
suppliers operate already close to marginal cost. Another factor
that cannot be ignored is that local currency underwent a near
35% appreciation against the US dollar between 2003 and 2009.
Further explanations can be found in relation to industrial,
treatment and procurement policies carried out by the Brazilian
government. As mentioned before, from 2002 onwards, the
government prioritized public generic supply. This policy aimed at
optimizing public sector production, which had started facing
excess capacity [13]. In fact, real production costs of publicly
supplied ARVs were not revised until 2007. Looking at nominal
values from our database, prices in local currency did not change
much since 2002 and it was not until 2008 that they started
decreasing again. Our results, indeed, show an overall decreasing
trend of demand for generic drugs, particularly in the most recent
years, confirming previous findings by Grangeiro and colleagues
(2006) [21] and Greco and Simao (2007) [22].
Another problem has to do with production scale. As Brazilian
ART guidelines offer multiple regimen options instead of
promoting systematic standardization of HAART, and some
production processes require the use of exclusive industrial plant
facilities, concomitant production of a high number of drugs shows
rather limited efficiency. This is not the case of ARV production in
the wider international market, where treatments tend to be
standardized according to WHO guidelines and scale is much
larger [30]. Finally, public laboratories lack vertical production
capacity as they are not able to integrate the entire drug
manufacturing process from API synthesis to drug formulation.
Since public laboratories rely on external sources of API, whose
supply is conditioned by public procurement legislation, and final
Table 3. Observed Interannual Changes in Brazilian ARV
Market Characteristics (1996–2009).
All
Originator
Drugs
Generic
Drugs
Change between t and t+1 (n=246) (n=78) (n=168)
%% %
PYD
Decrease 64.2 84.6 54.8
Increase 35.8 15.4 45.2
QYD
Decrease 47.2 50.0 45.8
Increase 50.4 48.7 51.2
Without Change 2.4 1.3 3.0
First-Line Therapy
Exclusion 3.3 5.1 2.4
Inclusion 6.9 11.5 4.8
Without Change 89.8 83.3 92.9
Intraclass Substitutes
Decrease 14.2 16.7 13.1
Increase 26.8 25.6 27.4
Without Change 58.9 57.7 59.5
Potential Suppliers
Decrease 39.0 5.1 54.8
Increase 28.1 24.4 29.7
Without Change 32.9 70.5 15.5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023478.t003
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across different public laboratories, production costs tend to be
leveled-up. An extra profit margin sometimes becomes necessary
in order to handle additional costs implied by risks of supply
shortages and by raw-material purification procedures.
By stratifying the analysis according to originator and generic
market segments, our modeling approach clarifies how differently
originator and generic suppliers react to market size and
competition in Brazil and highlights their distinct price dynamics.
Originator drugs proved insensitive to various price determining
factors, even after controlling for time-constant observed and
unobserved heterogeneity. Given the close fit of originator and
patented drugs (i.e., drugs holding either a valid or pending patent
in Brazil; r=0.852; p,0.001), this variable constitutes a proxy of
patent protection, where no direct generic competition exists.
Important exceptions in our sample refer to generic provision of
Efavirenz since 2007 (under compulsory license), and, originator
supply of Enteric Didanosine (off-patent) and Tenofovir (patent
denied in 2008). Additionally, the degree of innovation seems to
play an important role, as older drugs and older therapeutic classes
tend to cost less. Although intraclass alternatives are available, this
seems to produce no significant effect, suggesting that competition
for originator drugs is limited by therapeutic restrictions and
physician’s prescription practices that may not systematically use
opportunities of drug substitution. Finally, originator prices do not
respond to bulk procurement, confirming Lucchini and colleagues’
Table 4. Price Determinants in the Brazilian ARV Market (1996–2009): Pooled OLS at t+1.
Dependent Variable: Ln(PYD) All Originator Drugs Generic Drugs
(n=246) (n=78) (n=168)
2SLS OLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept 7.584*** 0.535 8.712*** 0.358 6.476*** 0.786
Ln(QYD) 20.235*** 0.072 20.053 0.033 20.286*** 0.088
Therapeutic Class: Reference NRTI
NNRTI 0.082 0.111 20.211 0.181 0.336*** 0.125
PI 0.854*** 0.094 0.383*** 0.112 1.672*** 0.157
FI 1.981*** 0.303 2.538*** 0.300
Drug Age $5 Years=1 20.256*** 0.098 20.274** 0.113 20.428*** 0.161
Exclusive for,60 kg Patients=1 21.256*** 0.131 21.093*** 0.204 20.928*** 0.150
Present in 1
st-Line Therapy=1 20.035 0.125 20.013 0.117 0.217 0.170
Number of Intraclass Substitutes 0.017 0.030 0.058 0.051 20.055 0.037
Number of Potential Suppliers 0.019 0.009 20.009 0.022 0.049*** 0.011
Originator Drug=1 1.323*** 0.109
Ln(GDP) 4 100,000 1.202*** 0.167 0.181 0.180 2.051*** 0.207
Number of Patients 4 10,000 20.099*** 0.010 20.086*** 0.018 20.124*** 0.012
Adjusted R
2 0.864 0.809 0.740
*Significant at 10%;
**Significant at 5%;
***Significant at 1%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023478.t004
Table 5. Time-Varying Characteristics of the Brazilian ARV Market (1996–2009): In-difference Model.
Dependent Variable: DLn(PYD) All Originator Drugs Generic Drugs
(n=246) (n=78) (n=168)
Changes between t and t+1 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
D Ln (QYD) 20.038** 0.016 20.016 0.018 20.051** 0.023
Not in 1
st-Line in t/in 1
st-Line in t+1=1 20.044 0.057 0.048 0.060 20.148* 0.086
D Number of Intraclass Substitutes 0.005 0.017 20.029 0.023 0.027 0.021
D Number of Potential Suppliers 20.034*** 0.009 20.013 0.020 20.021** 0.010
D Ln(GDP) 0.680*** 0.129 0.069 0.155 1.132*** 0.173
D Number of Treated Patients 20.140*** 0.015 20.112*** 0.024 20.158*** 0.018
Adjusted R
2 0.441 0.303 0.535
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023478.t005
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purchaser in a market) is able to compensate for monopoly power
only when alternative suppliers are available.
Although external factors to the Brazilian market were not
directly measured in our analysis, our results suggest pathways
through which they may influence originator drug prices. We
found no significant difference between NRTI and NNRTI prices
in our sample, which are the only classes allowed in WHO first-
line recommendations and where global generic competition and
market scale are the highest. At the same time, although originator
suppliers are more likely to benefit from changes in Brazilian
therapeutic guidelines, as they progressively incorporate more
patented drugs, the corresponding variable in our model
estimation held no significant effect. Moreover, strategic pricing,
as observed by Nunn and colleagues (2007) [23], dictates better
discounts for drugs that, although patented in Brazil, have generic
counterparts available in the global market. This practice may be
related to the increased likelihood of compulsory licensing threats
being made. Originator company strategic behavior may further
explain why market size, as measured by number of ART-treated
patients, holds a downward effect on prices.
The Brazilian ARV generic segment, on the contrary, resembles
competitive markets. Prices react to demand volume, number of
suppliers and economic cycles (as expressed in terms of GDP), as
well as changes concerning therapeutic guidelines and number of
treated patients that impact market scale. Price variation regarding
drug age and therapeutic class may respond to marginal
production cost variations [31]. Finally, price insensitivity to
availability of alternative products, like in the originator segment,
seems to refer to treatment characteristics that limit the degree of
drug substitutability. These findings allow a better understanding
of the consequences that changing market characteristics can hold
on generic supply. Recent price increases may indeed reflect
substantial drops in the number of available ARV suppliers, due to
political choices that rendered this segment less competitive. As
changes in therapeutic guidelines progressively shift demand
towards the incorporation of patented drugs, the role of generic
supply may become more and more limited. Although local
generic production capacity proved essential to strengthen the
bargaining power of Brazilian authorities in negotiations with
originator companies, dependence on imported APIs may impair
compulsory licensing of ARVs that are protected in the context of
mandatory compliance to TRIPS by all developing countries,
including India, after 2005.
Study Limitations
Our study is not without limitations. Focusing the analysis in the
Brazilian market, although improving data standardization, has
reduced our sample size, especially in the case of originator drugs.
However, it is reassuring that, for this market segment, results from
pooled OLS and in-difference estimation support each other.
Another limitation has to do with the extension of our findings to
other developing countries given some Brazilian specificities, such
as local production capacity, centralized procurement and low
reliance on FDCs. Many low-income countries lack pharmaceu-
tical laboratory facilities and count on third-parties for ARV
procurement. Furthermore, the global generic ARV market has
strongly specialized in FDC supply thanks to HIV care
standardization promoted by the WHO. Therefore, the applica-
tion of our model to other settings may require further
adaptations, as for example to allow for the inclusion of FDCs
where these represent an important share of ART, by employing
relevant stratification techniques necessary to assure comparability
between prices and purchased quantities. Moreover, due to
availability of data and econometric modeling constraints, the
variables we have used as proxies for capturing the amount of
competition between firms in both segments of markets (number of
intraclass substitutes and number of potential suppliers in the
market) were rather crude; in the future, more sophisticated
measures of market share by the largest firms may help improve
the estimations.
Final Remarks
Stratified analysis coupled by in-difference estimation, using ex-
ante and ex-post information on price evolution, offers a more
refined understanding of ARV price determinants and of how they
may affect market dynamics. In Brazil, generic suppliers are more
liable to respond to factors influencing demand size and market
competition, while originator suppliers set prices strategically. These
findings complement evidence provided by previous studies. Our
analysis further demonstrates that changing characteristics in the
generic segment, related to therapeutic, industrial and procurement
policies, have been interfering inthe process of ARVprice formation
in Brazil. While individualized care may improve treatment results
and avoid costs related to premature regimen changes and toxicities,
excessive complexity of ARV regimens can limit production
efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of preserving generic
market dynamics as it can also be supportive of ARV purchasers in
price negotiations they undertake with originator companies.
Demand shift towards new and more potent drugs, as
recommended by the latest WHO guidelines in a context of IPR
strengthening, makes of the Brazilian experience a reference case
for the challenges that may be faced by many developing countries
as more PLWHA access HAART and live longer. In the presence
of resource constraints, the sustainability of ART access clearly
depends on further price decreases, especially for ARVs included
in second and third-line regimens and for more powerful first-line
therapies. Price discrimination (the differential pricing of a product
for different markets) and IPR flexibilities, such as compulsory
licensing, although they may help reduce prices, they may do so
for a limited time-frame. Price discrimination is not consistently
applied according to countries needs and income and relies on the
good-will of originator companies [26]. Furthermore, compulsory
licensing is highly dependent on available production capacity,
including the local production of APIs where alternative sources
are scarce or restricted, and requires strong political will to face
retaliations from originator companies.
Our findings stress the need of preserving alternative sources of
ARV supply. Therefore, the acquisition of vertical production
capacity, the use of public procurement to create incentives for
private sector participation, and, improvements in drug produc-
tion efficiency remain important policy measures to increase
countries bargaining power in price and voluntary license
negotiations that can potentially benefit other health programs.
Recently, a patent pool initiative has been put in place to incite
originator companies issuing voluntary licenses to generic
producers. The principle behind this proposal is that, while
originator companies would earn additional royalties from drugs
sold to treat a higher number of patients, generic producers would
gain by entering the global market before patent expiry. The
Brazilian experience suggests that potential disadvantages of
patent pools, such as exclusivity agreements and risk of collusion,
should be carefully monitored not to harm market competition.
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